COA finds unavailability of ‘essential witnesses’ key to delay in CHINS case

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The Court of Appeals of Indiana has found a juvenile court that reset four times a factfinding hearing for a CHINS petition and, consequently, exceeded the 120-day statutory deadline did not abuse its discretion because the Indiana Department of Child Services needed extra time to procure the testimony of two physicians.

D.F. had her child, R.A.M.O., removed from her care after the Department of Child Services found D.F. refused to feed the infant. Department staff became concerned about the child’s weight and worried that the youngster could become malnourished or ultimately die because of the feeding issues.

A child-in-need-of-services petition was filed and the Johnson Circuit Court set a factfinding date of April 22, 2021.

However, at the request of the parties, that date was reset to June 21, 2021. The parties agreed to waive the 60-day statutory timeframe set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(a) that requires a factfinding hearing to be completed no later than 60 days after the CHINS petition is filed.

When June 21 arrived, DCS requested a continuance because the mother’s psychological examination revealed that she was mentally incompetent and needed to have a guardian appointed. The trial court granted the continuance and reset the factfinding for June 25, 2021.

The day before that date, DCS filed another motion for a continuance. It claimed that the attorney handling the matter had been admitted to the hospital and a substitute was not available because all the DCS attorneys in the region were out of town attending a mandatory training event.

Over the mother’s objection, the juvenile court again reset the factfinding for June 28, 2021. Subsequently, DCS filed an additional motion for a continuance explaining two of its “essential witnesses” were unavailable to testify on that date. It argued that both witnesses were physicians who had performed neuropsychological evaluations on the mother and their findings were therefore relevant to her ability to understand the underlying proceedings.

The juvenile court held a hearing on DCS’s second motion for a continuance and, again over the mother’s objection, reset the factfinding for July 14, 2021.

After the factfinding, the juvenile court issued an order determining R.A.M.O. was a CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, it concluded that the child’s best interests would be served by being removed from the mother’s home.

The mother appealed, arguing the juvenile court abused its discretion in continuing the factfinding hearing beyond the 120-day statutory time limit.

Despite noting the mother waived her 120-day timeframe argument because did not file a motion to dismiss when the factfinding hearing was not held by the deadline, the Court of Appeals still considered her abuse of discretion argument.

The appellate panel pointed out that after granting the June 21 and 25 requests, the juvenile court purposefully reset the factfinding hearing to June 28, which was still within the 120-day timeframe. However, when the key witnesses were unavailable to testify about the mother’s mental health, the trial court picked the July date, which was beyond the deadline.

“Ultimately, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it reset the factfinding hearing beyond the 120-day timeframe,” Judge Derek Molter wrote for the court. “DCS showed good cause when requesting additional time to procure its two essential witnesses, whose testimonies were directly related to Mother’s ability to comprehend the underlying proceedings, care for herself, and care for Child.

“As the juvenile court noted, the court and parties would have been prejudiced without testimony from the two physicians,” the COA continued. “And Mother has not shown or even asserted that she was prejudiced by the continuance.”

The case is In the Matter of R.A.M.O, Child in Need of Services, D.F., Mother, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 21A-JC-1873.

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