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The Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board must admit Marion County sheriff’s deputies into its de-escalation training program, the Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled Thursday, upholding a special judge’s ruling in favor of the Marion County Sheriff’s Office.
But the appellate court also vacated a supplemental ruling requiring the board to admit up to 20 Marion County deputies per year, describing that portion of the ruling as unnecessary dicta and potentially confusing.
Court of Appeals Judge Paul Mathias wrote the Thursday memorandum decision in Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, 23A-PL-655.
The sheriff’s office had sued the training board in November 2021, seeking declaratory judgment after the board refused to admit Marion County sheriff’s deputies for the statutorily required de-escalation training.
The board had argued that when the Indiana General Assembly consolidated law enforcement responsibilities in Marion County in 2005, it removed certain law enforcement obligations and authority from the sheriff’s office. That consolidation, the board argued, meant the deputies were not “law enforcement officers” as a matter of law.
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and in February, Senior Judge John Baker, presiding in Marion Superior Court 11, granted summary judgment to the sheriff’s office. In a subsequent order, Baker required the board to admit up to 20 Marion County deputies for training annually.
The board appealed, but according to the Court of Appeals, “On appeal, the Training Board wholly abandons the legal theory it presented to the trial court that the Sheriff’s deputies are not law enforcement officers who may enforce the penal laws of the State.”
“Instead of that theory, the Training Board asserts for the first time on appeal that the Sheriff’s deputies are not appointed by a merit board, and, for that reason, they are ineligible to receive training from the Training Board,” Mathias wrote. “The Training Board even criticizes the trial court for ‘focus[ing] on the nature of the work performed’ by the Sheriff’s deputies in its summary judgment order.
“We are a court of review, and our case law has long been clear that ‘[i]ssues not raised before the trial court on summary judgment cannot be argued for the first time on appeal and are waived,’” the judge continued. “… Accordingly, the Training Board’s argument on appeal is not properly before us, and we will not consider it.”
But the appellate court did vacate Baker’s supplemental order requiring the board to admit up to 20 Marion County deputies per year.
According to Mathias, “The trial court’s judgment here entered summary judgment on the Sheriff’s Office’s complaint for declaratory judgment. The court then amended its judgment to note that the Sheriff’s Office had conceded that it would not seek training for more than twenty deputies annually, and the court ordered the Training Board to not admit more than the Sheriff’s Office had conceded it would seek to train.”
The COA rejected the argument that the supplemental ruling was an “overbroad” injunction.
“That said,” Mathias continued, “we do understand the possibility for confusion from the trial court’s supplemental order. The supplemental order was unnecessary dicta and potentially confusing to the underlying judgment that Marion County Sheriff’s Office be treated the same way as all other law enforcement agencies by the Training Board.
“We therefore vacate the court’s supplemental order but otherwise affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Office,” he concluded.
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