Lake County Council can have power over county purchasing, data collection, COA affirms

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A dispute over who can make purchasing decisions and collect data for Lake County has been resolved in favor of the Lake County Council, despite opposition from the county’s commissioners.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana on Tuesday settled the dispute between the council and the commissioners in the case of Lake County Board of Commissioners v. Lake County Council, 21A-MI-1805.

Issues began between the municipal entities in October 2020, when the Lake County Council adopted Ordinance 1451B, establishing itself as the purchasing agency of Lake County.

The ordinance provided that the purchasing agency would be in charge of purchasing “all or certain services, supplies, materials and equipment as under existing laws are permitted to be purchased with County funds for any or all purposes.” The ordinance also stated that the Lake County Council would determine the qualifications required for the personnel who would make up the purchasing agency.

The council also adopted Ordinance 1451M, establishing the Lake County Data Processing Agency.

The agency was tasked with “coordinat(ing) the operations of the various data processing systems in Lake County” and was deemed “necessary for the economic welfare of the citizens of Lake County, Indiana.” Additionally, the council provided that the agency would be administered by a 15-member board that would be appointed by the council and “shall include” various county officials.

The county commissioners vetoed both ordinances, but the council voted to override the vetoes. The council then filed a declaratory judgment action, to which the commissioners responded with a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Ultimately, the Lake Superior Court granted summary judgment to the council and denied summary judgment for the commissioners. It later denied the commissioners’ motion to correct error but stayed the implementation of that order pending appeal.

A panel of the COA affirmed, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the commissioners’ motion to correct error “as its award of summary judgment in favor of the Council was proper.”

The COA began by noting that the two statutes at issue — Indiana Code §§ 36-2-3.5-4 and 36-2-3.5-5 — can be read harmoniously. Specifically, it found that that while in some circumstances the responsibilities at issue may fall to the county executive, in Lake County, the responsibilities fall to the legislative branch.

“Given the plain language of Indiana Code section 36-2-3.5-4, jurisdiction over the purchasing and data-processing agencies in Lake County falls squarely within the Council’s jurisdiction,” Chief Judge Cale Bradford wrote.

The appellate court also found no issue with the council’s decision to wait to enact the ordinances, and agreed with the council that nothing in Title 5 of the Indiana Code would prevent it from being the governmental entity appointed by law to be, and to oversee, the purchasing agency for Lake County. Additionally, the COA found that I.C. 36-1-3.5-5 clarifies that in Lake County, jurisdiction of the purchasing and data-processing agencies was transferred to the council.

As for the commissioners’ separation of powers argument, the COA found there was no such issue in the case at hand.

Finally, the court concluded there was no erroneous interpretation of I.C. 36-2-3.5-4(a) concerning the powers and duties of the county that are executive or administrative in nature.

“Upon review of the relevant statutes, we are convinced that the Council’s interpretation of these statutes fits better with the stated intent of the General Assembly, as expressed in Indiana Code section 36-2-3.5-4(a),” Bradford wrote.

“… For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Commissioners’ motion to correct error as its award of summary judgment in favor of the Council was proper.”

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