Indiana Court of Appeals
Wayne Doug Zollinger v. Wagner-Meinert Engineering, LLC
Civil Plenary. Affirms the Allen Superior Court order finding Wayne Zollinger breached the terms of his noncompetition agreements with his former employer Wagner-Meinert Engineering LLC, and its award to Wagner-Meinert of $38,657 in attorney fees. Affirms the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of WME on some issues and its bench trial rulings for WME on others. Finds the trial court did not err in ordering an injunction against Zollinger mandating compliance with noncompete agreements or in ordering him to pay more than $38,000 of WME’s attorney fees and expenses. Awards Wagner-Meinert additional appellate attorney fees and remands to the trial court for a calculation.
The 487 Broadway Company, LLC v. Kimberly K. Robinson, et al.
Civil plenary. Reverses the Lake Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Kimberly Robinson, Carol Seaton, Calumet Township of Lake County, and the Calumet Township Board against 487 Broadway Company’s complaint alleging negligence and breach of contract. Finds that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the township and that the court abused its discretion when it denied 487 Broadway’s motion to correct error. Reverses the entry of summary judgment, and remands to the trial court with instructions for the court to vacate all orders subsequent and relevant to the township’s motion to dismiss.
Roger Thayer v. State of Indiana
Criminal. Affirms Roger Thayer’s conviction for Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine after being found to be in possession of 13.52 grams of methamphetamine. Finds the Hendricks Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence recovered during the traffic stop. Rules the dog sniff, which lead to the discovery of the illegal drugs and paraphernalia, did not occur after the traffic stop had been completed so Thayer’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated.
In the Matter of: L.T. And S.T. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services
Juvenile CHINS. Affirms the adjudication of S.T. and J.T.’s minor child as a child in need of services. Holds that the Bartholomew Circuit Court’s admission of telephonic testimony amounted to harmless error. Finds the trial court properly admitted the investigative report of J.T.’s 2010 criminal conviction and properly adjudicated the child as a CHINS. Judge Elizabeth Tavitas concurs in result with a separate opinion.
Angela Thompson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Criminal. Affirms Angela Thompson’s sentence for conviction of Level 6 felony criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon and Level 3 felony possession of cocaine. Finds the Clark Circuit Court properly identified the mitigators and aggravators. Also finds that Thompson’s sentence to one year for criminal recklessness suspended to probation and to nine years for possession of cocaine with four years suspended to probation, with sentences to run concurrently, is not inappropriate in light of the offense and her character.
Dawn Riddle and Matthew Riddle v. Dennis Cress, Haley Wilkerson, and Helen Cress (mem. dec.)
Civil plenary. Reverses the Johnson Superior Court’s order granting a motion to set aside a default judgment filed by Dennis Cress, Helen Cress and Haley Wilkerson against Dawn and Matthew Riddle. Finds that the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the default judgment, finding that the record reflects the defendants were aware of their obligation to respond but chose not to do so, offering explanations in their motion that were disproven at the hearing. Remands to the trial court for further action on the merits. Judge Patricia Riley dissents with a separate opinion.
Kevin James McCaster, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Criminal. Affirms the Tippecanoe Circuit Court did not err when it excluded Kevin McCaster, Jr.’s children from his sentencing hearing for conviction of Level 6 felony domestic battery and two counts of Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. Finds the trial court had the inherent authority to exclude children from the sentencing hearing to protect them from hearing the specific details of the case.