Adoption petitions can’t be granted in favor of deceased grandfather, COA affirms

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A would-be adoptive grandfather who died before the trial court could rule on his adoption petitions was not entitled to have his petitions granted posthumously, the Court of Appeals of Indiana has ruled.

Grandfather L.G. and grandmother W.G. began caring for their great-grandchildren, A.F. and N.F., before either child turned 1. After the children were formally placed in their great-grandparents’ care, their mother’s parental rights were terminated and their father consented to their adoption.

Thus, in June 2021, L.G. and W.G. filed petitions to adopt A.F. and N.F. The Department of Child Services determined the grandparents were “qualified” to adopt the children, and a hearing was set for Nov. 5, 2021.

However, less than one week before the hearing, L.G. died, leaving his wife to proceed with the adoption petitions alone.

The Sullivan Circuit Court ultimately granted W.G.’s petitions but denied them as to L.G. because it “cannot grant an adoption of a child to a Petitioner who is already decreased.”

W.G. appealed, and the Court of Appeals noted in a footnote that she “contends that the issue is not moot because granting the adoption as to Adoptive Father ‘would result in the [C]hildren’s birth certificates being reissued with both parents as well as permitting [Adoptive Father’s social security] survivor benefits to pass to the minor children.’”

But the COA affirmed the denial of the grandfather’s adoption petitions, pointing to Indiana Code § 31-19-11-1(a) (2022).

“It is readily apparent that a deceased person cannot rear children or provide suitable support and education to children as required by Indiana Code Section 31-19-11-1(a)(2),” Judge Edward Najam wrote. “While the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Adoptive Father loved and cared for the Children while he was alive, Adoptive Father’s death means he is no longer able to provide care or support for the Children.”

The appellate court rejected W.G.’s reliance on Gonzalez v. Ortiz (In re J.O.), 141 N.E.3d 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), finding it distinguishable.

“… (T)he adoption of a child or children by a single individual is allowed under our statutes, and the court was not required to grant the petitions as to Adoptive Father simply because the Children will only have Adoptive Mother’s name on their birth certificates,” Najam wrote.

Lastly, as to W.G.’s Social Security benefits argument, the COA reiterated that “a deceased individual cannot rear a child or furnish suitable support and education, as required by the statute. And courts should not grant an otherwise improper adoption just to ensure that children receive certain benefits.”

“In sum, a trial court can only grant an adoption petition if it determines that the petitioner is of sufficient ability to rear a child and to furnish the child with suitable support and education. But a deceased individual does not have that ability,” Najam concluded in In the Matter of the Adoption of A.F. and N.F. (Minor Children); L.G. and W.G., 22A-AD-288. “Here, while there is no dispute that Adoptive Father loved the Children and cared for them while he was alive, Adoptive Father is no longer able to raise them or provide them with support. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err when it denied the adoption petitions as to Adoptive Father.”

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