Evidentiary hearing ordered after juror fails to disclosure knowledge of expert witness

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A trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine how familiar a potential juror in a medical malpractice case was with a doctor who was called an expert for the defense, the Court of Appeals of Indiana has ruled.

In Amanda Ping v. Margaret Inman, M.D., 23A-CT-251, Amanda Ping was a patient of Dr. Margaret Inman, who performed an exploratory laparoscopy on Ping.

In 2017, Ping filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance alleging that Inman had sewn Ping’s vaginal cuff to her bladder during the procedure.

A medical review panel found no malpractice, and Ping filed suit with the Marion Superior Court.

During voir dire, Juror 11 indicated that she knew of Dr. Aaron Ludwig and Dr. Maret Cline, two of Ping’s experts. But the juror did not indicate that she recognized one of Inman’s experts, Dr. William Cheadle, although it would later come out that she was, in fact, familiar with Cheadle.

Juror 11 went on to explain that she worked with doctors and nurses as a medical device vendor. She was ultimately seated on the panel.

The jury ruled in favor of Inman, and the trial court allowed counsel to speak informally with the jurors.

While there is no record of that meeting, counsel for both Ping and Inman provided affidavits claiming that Juror 11 admitted to knowing of Cheadle. However, the two sides differed on whether Juror 11 said she knew Cheadle to be credible.

Ping moved to correct error, claiming she was entitled to a new trial and an evidentiary hearing based on juror misconduct.

The trial court denied that motion without a hearing, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

“Because the record shows that there was a possibility of juror bias, the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing,” Judge Rudolph Pyle wrote, likening the case to Barnes v. State, 330 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. 1975), Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. 1988), and Diehl v. Clemons, 12 N.E.3d 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

“At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court can determine the extent of Juror 11’s knowledge of Dr. Cheadle and if it interfered with her ability to render a verdict solely on the evidence presented at trial,” Pyle wrote. “Much like we had previously held in Diehl, ‘the inquiry that should have occurred during voir dire must now occur in a post-trial evidentiary hearing.’

“Accordingly,” the COA concluded, “we remand to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Juror 11 was actually biased or prejudiced against Ping due to her familiarity with Dr. Cheadle through her work as a medical device vendor.”

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