IN justices take med-mal, delinquency cases

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The Indiana Supreme Court bench in the Indiana Statehouse (IL file photo)

The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to two cases out of 22 last week, including a medical malpractice case and a juvenile delinquency adjudication voided by the Court of Appeals of Indiana.

The case of Penny Korakis v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Michael R. Messmer, D.O., David A. Halperin, M.D., 22A-CT-867, was affirmed by the lower appellate court back in November. It is now Case No. 23S-CT-109 at the Supreme Court.

Penny Korakis was being treated at Memorial Hospital of South Bend after a car accident when doctors failed to properly read her X-rays of broken bones.

The St. Joseph Circuit Court found that Korakis’ expert affidavit failed to establish the standard of care expected or address the actions of the defendants, so summary judgment was granted to the defendants.

The COA agreed, rejecting Korakis’ argument that the affidavit created genuine issues of fact making summary judgment for the defendants improper.

The other case the high court agreed to hear is T.D. v. State of Indiana, 23S-JV-110.

In that case, the COA voided T.D.’s juvenile delinquency adjudication in a split opinion last October. The majority found that the Lake Superior Court failed to ensure the child knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights when he admitted to the offense.

The state had alleged T.D. was a delinquent for committing acts that would be Level 6 felony auto theft and Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult.

Judge Nancy Vaidik wrote for the majority, which included Judge Patricia Riley, concluding that the trial court did not adequately advise T.D. of his rights prior to accepting his admission.

Judge L. Mark Bailey dissented, finding the error did not make the judgment of the trial court void.

Oral arguments have not yet been scheduled for either case.

Of the 20 cases denied transfer, the court split in its denial of two.

One of those cases, Lacey M. Evans v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-174, prompted a written dissent from Chief Justice Loretta Rush, with Justice Geoffrey Slaughter joining.

Lacey Evans was convicted of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement after a domestic disturbance was reported at her home. An Indianapolis police officer knocked on her door, and after opening the door slightly, Evans slammed the door shut.

The majority opinion, written by Judge Margret Robb and joined by Judge Rudolph Pyle, found the state had provided sufficient evidence to support Evans’ conviction.

Judge Leanna Weissmann dissented, writing separately that she doesn’t view slamming a door as forcibly resistant, nor was there sufficient evidence that the officer was lawfully engaged in his duties when Evans forcibly resisted in-home arrest.

In her dissent to the denial of transfer, Rush wrote that the Evans case would give the high court the chance to provide clarity on what it means to “forcibly” resist law enforcement.

Rush was also the lone vote in favor of granting transfer to Dustin Passarelli v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-1116.

The COA split in affirming and remanding Dustin Passarelli’s appeal this past January. It found that the Army veteran could not call a psychologist to testify about PTSD in a murder case.

Chief Judge Robert Altice wrote for the majority, which was joined by Judge Elizabeth Tavitas, finding that the Marion Superior Court didn’t abuse its discretion when it determined that a psychologist’s anticipated testimony was inadmissible at trial to support the claim of self-defense.

Judge Elaine Brown disagreed in a separate dissenting opinion. She found that while the psychologist’s testimony could not be used for an ultimate factual determination, it could be elicited as to a person’s reasonable belief that he was under threat of imminent harm given his PTSD.

The full list of transfer decisions for the week ending April 28 is available online.

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